



**Supreme
Allied
Commander
Transformation**

M&S and Data Science to support commander's white picture

Jan Hodicky

jan.hodicky@act.nato.int

HQ SACT JFD MSTT

PUBLIC RELEASE


21-Oct-21
ACT M&STT

ACT - Improving today,
Shaping tomorrow,
Bridging the two

Agenda

- Introduction (M&S and Data Science)
- Problem Statement
- What we have so far in NATO Resilience?
- What we want to reach in the close future in NATO Resilience?
- ACT Resilience projects' key stakeholders
- What is expected to be portrayed in CMX 22?
- Current functionality of Resilience Data Analytics MVP
- Current functionality of Aggregated Resilience Model
- Interface between two ACT Resilience related projects for CMX 22 experiment
- Summary

Introduction M&S and Data Science



Problem statement

- Common Operating Picture
 - Blue picture
 - Red picture
 - **White picture** (Civil Environment)
- **How we can increase the understanding of the white picture and its relation to military operations in SACEUR's AoR?**
 - Assessment of National Civil Preparedness
 - Assessment of the Risk in military operationsWhile employing and synchronizing:
 - Data Science to bring the quantitative aspect and
 - M&S to bring the qualitative aspect
- White picture is formed in NATO through Resilience

What we have so far on Resilience?


- NATO approved Resilience vocabulary (7 Baseline Requirements – 7BLRs)
 - PO (2017) 0094 Evaluation Criteria on Resilience
 - Defense Planning Capability Surveys 2019
 - ACO Interim direction and guidance for resilience through civil preparedness
- Tools:
 - Resilience Data Analytics MVP creates connection to OpenSource data and real time analysis in SACEUR’s AOR
 - Work with high level of detailed geo-referenced information
 - Aggregated resilience model brings what if analysis over the 7 BLRs in SACEUR’s AOR plus visualization of the key output parameters
 - Work with high level of abstraction using system dynamics simulation paradigm – not geo specific data
 - Both tools has been experimented with end-users during the mini-exercise

What we want to reach in NATO Resilience?

- Initialize NATO Resilience Capability Development Program
 - Operational Requirement Statements (ORS)
 - All NATO Resilience community operational users' requirements
 - How to get there?
 - Experimentation during Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) 22
 - To inform the ORS development

ACT Resilience projects' key stakeholders

Strategic Dashboard



Three Civilian Functions



Four Military Functions




JFC Brunsumm

Resilience
Operational Level
Assessment
(Open Source Data)



CEPC SMES




SHAPE SMES

MODEL

CMX 2022 functionality: SHAPE J9 Resilience Assessment presentation

EXPERIMENT

White Picture D+0



Resilience Mission Impact:



Key Takeaways:

- Resilience in BSR has progressed since 2016, particularly in energy supply and civil transportation
- Simultaneous application of shocks inhibits system performance, but support to the military is largely retained
- Delivery of essential services to the population is most severely impacted by strategic shocks
- The system can withstand localized shock and demonstrates a reasonable period of recovery


PUBLIC RELEASE

ACT - Improving today,
Shaping tomorrow,
Bridging the two

CMX 2022 functionality: SHAPE J9 Resilience Assessment presentation (effects of electric blackout/cyber/ pandemic strategic shocks)

EXPERIMENT

White Picture Simulation D+11



Resilience Mission Impact:



Key Takeaways:


- Resilience in BSR has progressed since 2016, particularly in energy supply and civil transportation
- Simultaneous application of shocks inhibits system performance, but support to the military is largely retained
- Delivery of essential services to the population is most severely impacted by strategic shocks
- The system can withstand localized shock and demonstrates a reasonable period of recovery

ACT - Improving today,
Shaping tomorrow,
Bridging the two

CMX 2022 functionality: SHAPE J9 Resilience Assessment presentation (effects of electric blackout/cyber/ pandemic strategic shocks)

EXPERIMENT

White Picture Simulation D+23




PUBLIC RELEASE

ACT - Improving today,
Shaping tomorrow,
Bridging the two

CMX 2022 functionality: SHAPE J9 Resilience Assessment presentation (effects of electric blackout/cyber/ pandemic strategic shocks)

EXPERIMENT

White Picture Simulation D+28



Resilience Mission Impact:



Key Takeaways:

- Resilience in BSR has progressed since 2016, particularly in energy supply and civil transportation
- Simultaneous application of shocks inhibits system performance, but support to the military is largely retained
- Delivery of essential services to the population is most severely impacted by strategic shocks
- The system can withstand localized shock and demonstrates a reasonable period of recovery

PUBLIC RELEASE





ACT - Improving today,
Shaping tomorrow,
Bridging the two

Current Resilience Data Analytics MVP functionality



- Run by ACT Innovation Hub
- Agile methodology
- Main end-user is operational command – JFC Brunssum
- Leverage large amounts of information, open source data, social media and diverse media outlets to build a system level understanding of the civil environment
- Strong focus on data science methodology
 - Predictive analytics and forecasting
 - Machine learning methods
 - Natural Language Processing (NLP)

Energy BLR

Natural gas reserves




Transportation BLR




Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

- System Dynamics M&S paradigm and Stella Architect used
- 7 BLRS Casual Loop Diagrams (CLDs) modeled and validated with CEPC's SMEs (around 300 model's parameters)
- NATO Resilience assessment is based on Nations Resilience Assessment
- Aggregation mechanism to merge National Resilience Assessment (4 countries) through weighting approach



CLD example



Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

Aggregated Resilience Model for CMX22

COUNTRY PAGES

- Estonia Pages
- Latvia Pages
- Lithuania Pages
- Poland Pages

OUTPUT PAGES

- Aggregated Resilience Main Domains
- Aggregated Risk Assessment Functions
- Aggregated Resilience Decision Support System



INFO
PAGE

Current Aggregated resilience model capacity


- For each Nation input parameters needs to be set up prior the model use
- User is offered the limited set of parameters for what-if analysis

Current Aggregated resilience model capacity


Baseline Assessment Day 0 and effects of strategic shocks

- Outputs for each BLRs and each Nation are calculated


Communication




Transportation



FW - Water



FW - Food



Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

Strategic shocks and generic event inputs

- 4 categories of strategic shocks can be defined

Poland Strategic Shocks Input Page

7BLRs Input | **Strategic Shocks Input Page** | Events Input Page | 7 BLR Output Page | Resilience Main Domains Page | Risk Assessment Functions Page

PANDEMIC

Start Time of Pandemic: 35 | End Time of Pandemic: 75

Pandemic Staff Loss Fraction

Food and Water	Transportation	Communication
0,05 0,075 0,1	0 0,5 1	0 0,5 1

Mass Casualty, Medical Staff

Pandemic Demand Effects

Comm Multiplier	Cargo Transportation Increase Rate	Passenger Transportation Decrease Rate
0 50 100	0 0,5 1	0 0,5 1

CYBER ATTACK

Start Time of Cyber Attack: 10 | End Time of Cyber Attack: 75

Cyber Attack Demand Effect

Communication Multiplier: 0 50 100

BIG HUMAN MOVEMENT

Start Time of Big Human Movement: 20 | End Time of Big Human Movement: 75

Big Human Movement Demand Effects

Transportation Increase Rate	Comm Multiplier	Food and Water Increase Rate
0 0,5 1	0 50 100	0 0,5 1

ELECTRICITY BLACKOUT ?

ON OFF

Alternative Shock Input Page (Graphical)

COVER PAGE
HOME PAGE
DSS PAGE
RUN
PAUSE
RESUME
RESET
IMPORT DATA
EXPORT DATA
PREVIOUS PAGE
NEXT PAGE

Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

Strategic shocks and generic event inputs

- An event can be defined causing decrease in the capacities in one of 7BLRs

Poland Events Input Page

7BLRs Input Strategic Shocks Input Page **Events Input Page** 7 BLR Output Page Resilience Main Domains Page Risk Assessment Functions Page

ENERGY BLR				FOOD AND WATER BLR	
Capacity Destruction			Embargo	Capacity Destruction	
Energy Generation	Energy Transmission	Energy Distribution	Start	End	Water Distribution
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
Start: 10	Start: 10	Start: 10	Start: 15	End: 45	Start: 15
0 0,5 1	0 0,5 1	0 0,5 1	0 0,5 1		0 0,5 1
Destruction Magnitude	Destruction Magnitude	Destruction Magnitude	Import Ratio		Destruction Magnitude

COMMUNICATION BLR

Capacity Destruction

Start: 10

0 0,5 1

Destruction Magnitude

TRANSPORTATION BLR

Capacity Destruction

Start: 15

0 0,5 1

Destruction Magnitude

MASS CASUALTY BLR

Mass Casualty Severity Rate

Start: 10 0,001 0,006 0,01


End: 40

COVER PAGE HOME PAGE DSS PAGE RUN PAUSE RESUME RESET IMPORT DATA EXPORT DATA PREVIOUS PAGE NEXT PAGE

Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

Strategic shocks effects

- 3 Resilience main domains




Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

Strategic shocks effects

- Risk in four military functions

Poland RAFs

7BLRs Input Strategic Shocks Input Page Events Input Page **7 BLR Output Page** Resilience Main Domains Page Risk Assessment Functions Page




COVER PAGE HOME PAGE DSS PAGE RUN PAUSE RESUME RESET IMPORT DATA EXPORT DATA PREVIOUS PAGE NEXT PAGE


Current Aggregated resilience model capacity

Strategic shocks effects

- Aggregated strategic dashboard



Current ACT Resilience projects capacity and CMX 22 experimentation



Summary

- Two ACTs' projects on Resilience will be used in CMX 22 by SHAPE J9 in the form of the experiment for the benefits of NATO Resilience Capability Development
- The experiment will not interfere the execution of CMX 22
- Model and Interface validation work was the critical moment of the project
- Open Source Data is simply not enough for the NATO Resilience assessment